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Abstract
Smart Home Personal Assistants (SPA) such as Amazon
Echo/Alexa and Google Home/Assistant have made our daily
routines much more convenient, allowing us to complete tasks
quickly and efficiently using natural language. It is believed
that around 10% of consumers around the world already own
an SPA, and predictions are that ownership will keep rising.
It is therefore paramount to make SPA secure and privacy-
preserving. Despite the growing research on SPA security
and privacy, little is known about users’ security and privacy
perceptions concerning SPA complex ecosystem, which in-
volves several elements and stakeholders. To explore this, we
considered the main four use case scenarios with distinctive
architectural elements and stakeholders involved: using built-
in skills, third-party skills, managing other smart devices, and
shopping, through semi-structured interviews with SPA users.
Using a grounded theory approach, we found that users have
incomplete mental models of SPA, leading to different per-
ceptions of where data is being stored, processed, and shared.
Users’ understanding of the SPA ecosystem is often limited
to their household and the SPA vendor at most, even when
using third-party skills or managing other smart home devices.
This leads to incomplete threat models (few threat agents and
types of attacks) and non-technical coping strategies they im-
plement to protect themselves. We also found that users are
not making the most of the shopping capabilities of SPA due
to security and privacy concerns; and while users perceive
SPA as intelligent and capable of learning, they would not like
SPA learning everything about them. Based on these findings,
we discuss design recommendations.
Copyright is held by the author/owner. Permission to make digital or hard
copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee.
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1 Introduction
The adoption of smart home personal assistants (SPA) has
rapidly increased in the last few years [5]. Estimates suggest
that 10% of the world consumers own an SPA [37], and that
over 50 million Amazon Echo devices have been sold to
date in the US alone [27]. SPA benefit from recent advances
in Natural Language Processing to handle a wide range of
commands and questions in a playful way, with a name and
a gender assigned to the SPA, which encourages users to
personify them and therefore interact with them in a human-
like manner and be more engaging [32]. SPA are used to shop,
stream music, and set timers, alarms and reminders among
many others [43].
Despite the numerous benefits and convenience SPA bring,
they also raise security and privacy concerns. Prior work, in-
cluding [12,17,22,28], already highlighted numerous security
and privacy issues in general with smart home technologies
and in particular with SPA. In addition, very recent research
also studied users’ privacy concerns with SPA [19, 30], but
this research typically centred around privacy and the smart
speaker part of the SPA ecosystem. However, smart speakers
are just the tip of the iceberg, i.e., an SPA is normally com-
posed of at least a smart speaker such as Amazon Echo and a
cloud-based voice assistant such as Amazon Alexa. Also, the
SPA ecosystem is complex and includes several parties: the
SPA provider, multiple third-party providers of skills or ac-
tions that SPA can request following users’ voice commands
(e.g. playing music through Spotify), and multiple providers
of other smart home devices (e.g. smart bulbs) being managed
through the SPA.
To bridge this gap, in this paper we focus on the following
research questions. What are users’ perceptions of the SPA
architecture and the SPA data ecosystem? What threat models
do users have concerning SPA? What mitigation strategies do
users use to alleviate risk and other challenges they face?
To answer these research questions, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with seventeen current SPA users. Fol-
lowing a grounded theory approach, we interviewed people
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who had been using Amazon Echo/Alexa and Google Home-
/Assistant, which are the two most used SPA and together
dominated circa 87% of the SPA market as of 2017 [39]. We
particularly asked about their use of the SPA, how they think
SPA process and complete their requests, as well as other
data activities like storage, sharing and learning using the
four main use cases of SPA: built-in skills (such as setting
reminders and alarms), third-party skills (such as Spotify and
Uber), managing other smart devices (such as smart bulbs
and smart TVs), and shopping. We also elicited users’ threat
models and the strategies they use to protect themselves when
using SPA.
Our contributions include:
• We present users’ understanding of SPA’s ecosystem,
discussing their conceptions and misconceptions about
how data is processed, stored, shared and learned by SPA
and the actors involved through four main use cases of
SPA (built-in skills, third-party skills, managing other
smart devices, and shopping). We show that users have
a limited understanding of SPA, which leaves them with
very inaccurate and at best incomplete mental models of
the SPA ecosystem.
• We uncover the lack of trust users have with some of the
use cases of SPA, in particular shopping, and how this
is hampering adoption of these use cases, providing the
reasons we found behind this phenomenon.
• We report the threat models users have of SPA, showing
both threat agents and types of attacks users consider
possible. We also show the mainly non-technical coping
strategies users follow to try to protect themselves.
• and, we present design implications for how SPA might
support users’ expectations and needs with regards to
privacy and security.
2 Background
Smart Home Personal Assistants (SPAs) have a complex ar-
chitecture [14], as depicted in Figure 1, that usually involves
at least a smart speaker (e.g. Amazon Echo, Google Home)
and a cloud-based voice personal assistant (e.g. Alexa, Google
Assistant). A normal request works as follows, the user utters
a request to the smart speaker, which is then processed in
the SPA provider’s cloud using Natural Language Processing
to understand users’ speech and intent. Once the intent is
identified, the SPA provider delegates the user request to a
set of Skills1. Skills provide users with functions such as the
ability to play music, check weather updates, control other
smart home devices and shopping. There are currently over
1Note that, for easy of exposition, we adopt Amazon’s terminology of
Skills, but these may be called differently in other SPA platforms. For in-
stance, in Google Assistant, skills are called Actions instead.
70,000 Alexa skills [1] and 2,000 Google Assistant skills [34].
There are two main types of Skills: Built-in Skills provided
by the SPA provider (e.g. Weather updates, Shopping) and
Third-party Skills provided by third party developers using
the development Skill Kits (e.g. Spotify, Smart Home De-
vices). Importantly, third-party skills are typically hosted in
a remote web service host controlled by the developer of the
third-party skill. Finally, any outputs produced by a Skill are
sent back to the SPA Provider, which generates a spoken re-
sponse, which is then push backed to the smart speaker, which
plays the response to the user.
Smart Home Devices
Smart device Cloud 
Service Provider
SPA Cloud Service 
Provider (Amazon, 
Google)
Smart Home Personal 
Assistants 
(Amazon Echo, Google Home)
Third-Party 
Skills
In-Built 
Skills
CLOUDHOME
Figure 1: Sketch of the SPA Ecosystem (inspired by [14]).
3 Related Work
In this section, we first discuss research conducted on users’
security and privacy perceptions in the Smart Home in general.
Then, we discuss research that focused on the security and
privacy of SPA in particular.
3.1 Security and Privacy of the Smart Home
Extensive research has been conducted on the security and
privacy of smart homes. For example, from a more human
factors point of view, prior work studied users’ mental models
for smart home devices. Zeng et al. [46] conducted semi-
structured interviews on fifteen smart home owners examin-
ing users’ mental models about their device. They found that
users who had advanced mental models about their device
were those with highly technical level of understanding regard-
ing their smart home system whilst those with intermediate
level of mental models showed some level of understanding
on how their smart home system works [46]. Similarly Zheng
et al. [47] conducted semi-structured interviews with eleven
smart home owners to be able to understand their privacy
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perceptions of the devices. Their work highlighted that smart
home owners prioritize convenience over privacy and will
allow their data to be shared if their perceived benefits out-
weigh privacy risks. Also users perceived that it is the device
manufactures responsibility to protect users privacy. More re-
cently, Emami-Naeini et al. [15] studied security and privacy
perceptions of IoT device owners examining their concerns
prior and after purchase. Users were asked to rank important
factors when they are considering to purchase an IoT device,
with security and privacy ranking highly important. They also
showed users a security and privacy label prototype aimed at
helping them make better security and privacy decisions when
purchasing IoT devices [15]. In [36], the authors studied smart
home security identifying issues that influence or affect secu-
rity decisions in the home, e.g., perceived competence, trust
and cost were some of the factors identified. Finally, He et
al. [24] examined access control specification and authentica-
tion in the home IoT, looking at different access controls that
can be applied for different tasks depending on the context.
While the works above considered the smart home, including
SPA, they did not consider the SPA ecosystem in full.
3.2 Security and Privacy of SPA
There has been an increasing amount of research focusing ex-
clusively on SPA security and privacy. One line of research fo-
cused on technical attacks and defences. For instance, Haack
et al. [22] and Kumar et al. [28] reported vulnerabilities of
Amazon Alexa, focusing on the speech recognition ability of
SPA (e.g., interpretation errors of user commands exposing
the device to outside attacks). In terms of defences, Lei et
al. [31] implemented a Virtual Security Button (VSB) which
detects the presence of human motion and then prevents unau-
thorized access. Huan et al. [16] proposed a continuous voice
authentication mechanism for SPAs that aims to ensure SPA
works solely on commands from a legitimate user. Kepuska
et al. [26] proposed a multi-model dialogue system that com-
bines various factors such as; voice, video, head and body
movements for secure SPA authentication.
Another line of research focused on human factors of secu-
rity and privacy in SPA. In particular, previous work studied
users’ perceptions, including Frutcher and Liccardi [19], who
examined users’ online reviews of SPA to understand privacy
and security concerns. More recently, Lau et al. [30] studied
users and non-users reasons for and against adopting SPA.
Their findings highlighted that many non-users did not see
the benefit in using SPA while users shared privacy risks
such as the device listening but would rather trade privacy for
convenience. Our work differs from previous work on users’
perceptions of SPA security and privacy, as we consider the
whole SPA ecosystem, while previous works tended to focus
more on the smart speaker part of the SPA only.
4 Methodology
To answer our research questions, we conducted a qualitative
study following a semi-structured approach [6] and Grounded
Theory [8, 20]. We used a pre-screening process and semi-
structured interviews as detailed below. The study was re-
viewed and approved by King’s College London IRB.
4.1 Pilot Study
We created an initial version of the interview script to explore
users’ perceptions around our main research questions. Be-
fore running the full study, we conducted five preliminary
interviews. We recruited interviewees internally within our
university with the aim of ensuring that the interview ques-
tions were easy for interviewees to understand, did not take
too long to complete, and would provide insights with regards
to our research questions without guiding or biasing the inter-
viewees. With these aims in mind, we conducted and analyzed
the preliminary interviews and refined the interview script
twice. None of the data collected during the pilot study was
used in the final data analysis.
4.2 Recruitment and Screening
We recruited potential participants through Prolific
(www.prolific.ac) and internally within King’s College
London. All potential participants were asked to fill out
a screening survey which queried for their demographic
information (age, gender, education background, employment
status), the SPA and other type of smart devices they own,
what they use the SPA for, and how long they have been using
the SPA — see Appendix A for the screening questions. The
questionnaire took on average 10 minutes to complete and
the participants who completed the survey through Prolific
were compensated with an average of £1.20.
The screening responses were used to select Amazon Echo
or Google Home owners who had been using their SPA for
at least one month and had used the device for various tasks
such as setting the alarm or reminders, using third-party skills,
shopping or managing other smart home devices. Our demo-
graphics data also helped us to select participants in a way
in which we would maximize demographic coverage. This
was done to ensure that selected participants had experience
in using the SPA since we wanted to elicit their mental mod-
els regarding how SPA work while making sure we had a
balanced sample of demographic data. In some cases, the de-
cision was to take everyone who completed the questionnaire
in a logical way, but with a particular characteristic, e.g., we
invited all valid participants who said they used the device for
shopping because of the low number of participants saying
they used the device for shopping. Finally, we included some
questions designed to rule out participants just pretending to
be SPA owners.
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The recruitment phase took place between November 2018
and January 2019. The qualified participants were contacted
and invited for an interview. Participants were asked to pro-
vide their Skype ID. Because this is personally identifiable
data, we needed approval from prolific to use such informa-
tion to recruit participants. We contacted Prolific informing
them about our research and the type of data we would be
collecting, and our request was approved.
4.3 Participants
From the recruitment and screening process, we received a
total of 43 (31 prolific, 9 internal) responses, from which 31
qualified for an interview following the criteria explained
above. We contacted all of them, and from the 23 who re-
sponded to be available for an interview, we then ordered
and prioritized them in order to maximize demographics and
SPA usage, until saturation was reached — more details about
the methodology and data analysis below. In total, we inter-
viewed 17 participants (13 Prolific and 4 internally). Table 1
summarizes demographic and SPA usage information for all
the participants. The interviews were conducted via Skype
or in person between January 2019 and February 2019, and
participants were rewarded with £10 for completing the inter-
view.
4.4 Interview Protocol
Interviews were led and conducted by the lead researcher.
Before the interviews, we provided the participants with an
information sheet, which explained the purpose of the study.
During the interview, the lead researcher introduced them-
selves and further explained the purpose of the study. We then
asked for consent to participate and record audio.
To make participants feel at ease and establish rapport, the
interview started with general questions about the participant
and their device, we asked them what type of device they
owned, what they use it for, how often they used it, how long
they have been using it, and whom they were using it with.
The second set of questions focused on asking participants
about other smart home devices they own; what devices they
owned and if they use their smart assistant to control or com-
municate with those devices. Then, we asked participants
about how they registered and set up their devices. This in-
cluded questions about voice recognition and purchasing.
To understand and elicit users’ mental models about the
infrastructure and the data ecosystem, we created four sce-
narios regarding how the device is used. We would then ask
about each scenario depending on the previous answers of the
participants, i.e., if they said they had other smart devices they
connected the SPA to, then we would ask about the scenario
about managing smart home devices. Each scenario was struc-
tured as follows. At the beginning of each scenario, we asked
Table 1: Summary of Participants.
# participants
Gender
Male 8
Female 9
Age
18 - 20 2
21 - 25 4
26 - 30 5
31 - 40 3
41 - 50 2
51+ 1
Highest Level of Education
High school/College course 6
Undergraduate 2
Graduate 8
Postgraduate 1
Employment status
Full time 9
Part-time 3
Unemployed 1
Retired 1
Student 3
Device Type
Amazon Echo 10
Google Home 7
Period of usage
1-6 months 5
6-12 months 6
1-2 years 4
2+ years 2
Device use
Set alarm, reminders and checking the weather 13
Third-party Skills (e.g. Spotify) 11
Managing smarthome devices 6
Shopping 4
participants to think and describe how the SPA worked to com-
plete each request. The second set of questions asked about
data storage (including the requests themselves), where data
is stored and for how long. The last set of questions focused
on whether data was shared and with whom. We describe the
scenarios below:
Scenario 1 - Built-in Skills
In scenario 1, we asked users to think about instances
when they asked the device to give them a weather or
traffic update. We then asked them to describe how their
devices processed their request when using in-built skills.
After this, we asked them if such requests are stored, and
if yes, where they are stored and for how long. The last
set of questions focuses on understanding if data are
being used for other purposes than responding to their
requests and by whom.
Scenario 2 - Third-party Skills
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In Scenario 2, we asked users about third-party skills
they used (e.g. Spotify) by asking them to describe how
they think the process works regarding how requests are
processed and handled. We then asked them whether
they think their requests are stored and if so where and
for how long. Regarding data sharing, we also asked
them if they think their data is shared with third-party
skill providers as well as other third-parties such as ad-
vertisers.
Scenario 3 - Managing smart home devices
The purpose of scenario 3 was to understand how users
perceived SPA’s interaction with other smart home de-
vices — e.g., smart bulbs. We asked users to describe
how the SPA controls or manages other smart home de-
vices. We began by asking users to think about instances
when they controlled other smart home devices with
their SPA. Then, we asked them to describe the process
to us. We followed asking them if requests are stored.
If the user thought these requests were stored, then we
continued to ask them where they were stored and for
how long. Regarding data sharing, we first asked users
if requests were shared with the provider of the smart
home device. Then, we asked if SPA’s provider (Ama-
zon or Google) together with the smart device provider
shared data with other third-party companies.
Scenario 4 - Shopping
In the last scenario, we asked participants to describe
how they use the device to shop and how do they think
the process works. Similar to other scenarios, we asked
them if the device stored their requests including pur-
chase history and for how long. We also asked them if
the data was used for other purposes and shared with
other third-party companies.
The last set of questions focused on understanding users’
threat models concerning the device. Instead of asking par-
ticipants plainly whether they had security or privacy con-
cerns about using the device, we asked participants what their
thoughts were of the SPA capabilities to learn about them
based on their interactions with it, who might want to take
advantage or exploit the SPA and how, and if they had any con-
cerns about the SPA. Before we concluded the interview, we
asked participants about how they protected their devices or
mitigated concerns if they mentioned some exploits or other
concerns. We provide the final interview script in Appendix
B.
4.5 Data Analysis
Following a grounded theory approach [8,20], two researchers
independently started the coding process immediately after
the first two interviews. Coding was started early to iden-
tify interesting codes and categories that could be explored
in-depth. The interview scripts were then analyzed through
several iterative stages of open, axial and selective coding.
When new codes or themes emerged, both researchers met
and discussed the new findings and amended the interview
script where necessary to explore the new codes or themes in
depth. Examples of the codes that emerged very early were:
useful, best fit, control, and convenient were prevalent. We
discussed and coded these codes under “Useful” as a theme
that we defined to denote that users found the device to be
useful. New codes stopped emerging after the ninth and tenth
transcripts, but we stopped interviewing new participants after
number seventeen to confirm we had reached saturation, i.e.,
to check new codes or themes would not emerge. During the
selective coding phase, we ordered and grouped our themes
into more broad and abstract groupings to answer our research
questions.
5 Findings
This section presents the results of our study. It is structured
as follows. It begins by reporting the results in terms of how
users use and setup the SPA and the different parts of the
ecosystem. Then, we report the different perceptions users
have of data processing, storage, sharing and learning across
the SPA ecosystem. After this, we focus on the results about
one particular use case: shopping, as we found a general lack
of trust in SPA shopping capabilities that we study more in-
depth considering users who do not shop at all, users who
only do part of the shopping process (e.g. shopping lists), and
users who do purchase using the SPA. Finally, we report on
the threat models users have and the kind of defences and
coping strategies they put in place to tackle the threats.
5.1 Device Usage
Participants used SPA for various tasks, all of them falling
into the four main use case scenarios:
Built-in Skills. Participants mentioned they used their SPA
to complete everyday tasks such as setting an alarm, setting
reminders and checking the weather.
Third-party Skills. When asked about third-party skills,
participants mentioned using Spotify to listen to music, Uber
to call a taxi, Fuel Finder for checking fuel prices, etc.
Managing Other Smart Home devices. Participants also
shared using their SPA to manage other smart home devices.
In particular, six participants reported controlling other smart
home devices. The devices included: smart bulbs, smart TVs
and other smart speakers. In addition, some of our participants
had tried to connect their SPA to other smart home devices
they own but they did not succeed.
Shopping. Four participants use the SPA for shopping. In
particular, from those who use SPA for shopping, most of
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them use SPA mainly to create shopping lists to later on
purchase the items through the website or mobile application,
as opposed to purchasing through the SPA. We explore the
reasons for this in-depth in Section 5.4.
5.2 SPA Setup
From our 17 participants, 14 reported having set up their SPA
while 3 stated that a partner or family member2 had set up the
device for use. All participants who set up the device stated
that the setup process was easy and straightforward. They also
stated that they used their personal Amazon and Google ac-
counts to set up their devices. These were accounts that users
were also using for other personal purposes such as shopping
(Amazon accounts), and Android devices (Google/Gmail ac-
counts). Both sets of users reasoned that it was easier and
more convenient to use existing accounts than creating new
ones, and that they preferred sharing it across the household
rather than setting up multiple accounts — “It is better to
share one for convenience sake” (P2). This is something that,
to some extent, one could expect as it was already shown
to happen in other home settings [33]. However, other par-
ticipants reported that they wanted to link the devices with
existing accounts and enjoy more of the added functionality
and benefits SPA bring to them. As P10 put it “so that its easy
for me to see what’s on my calendar”, i.e., by linking the par-
ticipant’s existing account to their SPA they can set reminders
that will sync with their regular calendar system. We found
this particularly interesting, as it reinforces the importance
of looking at the whole SPA ecosystem not just at the smart
speaker placed in households.
5.2.1 Voice Recognition Setup
Although mostly used by the SPA for personalization rather
than for security purposes, both Google Home/Assistant and
Amazon Echo/Alexa offer voice recognition mechanisms for
recognizing the voices of different users, so that they can
tell users apart and personalize the interaction with them,
named Voice Match [21] and Voice Profiles [2] respectively.
In particular, Google users are given the opportunity to con-
figure voice recognition as part of the initial setup process.
Six Google users (6/7) setup voice recognition and reported
that the device is usually able to distinguish their voices from
the others, but with the mechanism being far from perfect,
e.g. P12 said “the times we have tested it seems that it can
like but 70% of the time it doesn’t seem perfect”. In contrast,
Amazon users are only given the chance to test the speech
recognition process (ability to convert spoken words into a
text and understand users’ intent) as part of the initial setup,
but not to configure voice recognition. Voice recognition (in
2Note here that we did not get into the tensions between those setting the
devices and other household members, as this was already studied in-depth,
including SPA too, in [46].
this case Voice Profiles) can be set up at any point but always
after the initial setup and as a separate process. Only 2 out
of the 10 Amazon users reported completing voice recogni-
tion. Most users who did not set it up did not even know that
this mechanism actually exists. Interestingly enough, some of
those who did not complete voice recognition seemed not to
understand or differentiate between speech recognition and
voice recognition, and they would confuse them, thinking the
SPA can distinguish between people without having set voice
recognition. For those who understood the difference, they ex-
plained that speech recognition was a feature that allowed the
device to recognize speech and change it to text while voice
recognition involved the device being able to tell who is talk-
ing. When asked how the process works, they revealed that
the device has an AI system which compared voices to dis-
tinguish between users. While these group of users reported
that voice recognition is used to distinguish between users,
some said it was for recognizing different accents (actually
meaning speech recognition).
5.2.2 Third-party Skills Setup
Some third-party skills need to be setup either in terms of the
permissions they need to access, e.g. smart speaker country
and postcode for the case of Fuel Finder, or to link them to
other online accounts to provide the functionality required,
e.g., playing music through Spotify. We asked participants to
describe the process of setting up the third-party skills they
use. In some cases, this already started to shed light about
their mental models. To setup the skill users share configuring
their SPA to the skill they want to use. For example, P11 said:
“directly connected to my spotify account so it directly logs in
to spotify and play music”.
5.2.3 Connecting to Smart Home Devices
Managing other smart home devices through an SPA obvi-
ously requires connecting the SPA to the device. We asked
participants to describe the process of connecting their SPA to
their other smart home devices. They mentioned downloading
the other smart home device mobile application and config-
uring it to their SPA, for example P3 stated “I have the app
on my phone so I use that to manage my activities between
Alexa and the lamp”. Other participants shared negative setup
experiences, with some of them unable to connect their smart
home devices to the SPA, with P9 stating “I was unable to
configure my smart TV, google home can’t find the device”.
5.2.4 Shopping Setup
Both Amazon Echo/Alexa and Google Home/Assistant sup-
port shopping lists by default, so users can just create lists and
add items to buy. In terms of actually completing a purchase,
Amazon allows users to optionally create a 4-digit pin code
to be used when purchasing online. In particular, one of our
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participants had set the code. Others who did not use their
SPA for any shopping activities simply did not have the voice
purchasing code setup and had it disabled. It should be noted
that if a user has Amazon Voice Profiles (voice recognition)
setup, they need to setup the pin code for purchasing but do
not need to say it every time they want to complete a purchase.
5.3 Perceptions of SPA’s Ecosystem
In order to explore what perceptions users had of the ecosys-
tem, we considered all the four main use case scenarios and
asked about different information-related activities (data pro-
cessing, data storage, data sharing, data learning) and how they
thought these activities where being conducted and where.
5.3.1 Data Processing
In general, our analysis shows that most SPA users believe that
data collected by the device is processed locally in the device,
though a few reported that the device needed to be connected
to the Internet to work. Others explained that their requests
are processed remotely and relayed back to the device. We
explain this in detail below per type of use case, as there were
some interesting differences worth mentioning across them.
Built-in Skills. When asked to describe how the device
processes and fulfills requests like weather updates, 10 out of
the 13 participants that used built-in skills explained that the
device locally processes these commands and respond to the
user. For instance, one user described the device as a small
brain, implying that the device listens and process commands
before responding to the user. We also found a few partici-
pants who believe that the device communicates with the SPA
provider to process commands and then responds to the user,
but in many of these cases, this was because they thought the
SPA connected with an online source of information to pro-
cess requests. For instance, one participant mentioned that the
device connected to the Google website for weather updates.
P9 shared this “... with the weather. I believe it comes from
the Google site from their weather service”.
Third-party Skills. We observed that 10 out of the 11 par-
ticipants who use third-party skills do not consider the third-
party skills providers when describing how SPA process their
request when a third-party skill is involved. While some users
reported that data is sent to the SPA provider for process-
ing, they did not mention any communication between the
SPA provider and the third-party skill provider. This contrasts
sharply with the very few participants who had a better un-
derstanding, though still incomplete and inaccurate, of how
the process works when the SPA uses third-party skills. For
instance, P8 stated “well Alexa when I say I want to play a
song she’ll then connect to Spotify and search through the
catalogue I guess then play the song”.
Managing Smart devices. We found that 5/6 participants
believe that the smart speaker and other smart home devices
communicate directly without involving other elements of
the SPA architecture. For instance, when switching the smart
lights on, they believe that the device communicates directly
with the lights, implying that both the SPA provider and the
smart light provider are not involved in any way. Some partic-
ipants think these devices communicate through the mobile
app (i.e., other smart home device’s mobile app) installed in
their mobile phones. For example, P2 said: “basically Google
Home talks to the light bulb via the mobile app installed, and
they are connected via the network so I will say OK Google
turn the light off/On and it will send the request to the appli-
cation that controls the Philips light”.
Shopping. We found users shopping using the SPA talked
about voice purchasing much in the same way as they would
do for normal online purchases. For instance P5 said “I just
ask Alexa to add items to my basket”. They also mentioned
the SPA provider as being somehow involved in the process
as the market/account they were buying from, e.g. P13 said
“once i ask alexa to add item to my basket she updates it on
my Amazon account”. While most of our participants did not
complete the purchasing process using the device, we asked
all users for their views concerning voice purchasing. The
majority (13 out of the 17), reported having not thought about
the process, but we observed that, similarly to those who use
SPA to shop, their current online shopping practices influence
their understanding of the voice purchasing process. They
think about how they would select an item to buy, choose the
method of payment and confirm the order.
5.3.2 Data Storage
In general, most users believe that their voice recordings, the
history log and shopping history are all stored by the SPA
provider. These users think this information is kept for build-
ing a profile about them, i.e. to understand their behaviour
and interests. Regarding where data is stored, half of our in-
terviewees believed that data collected by the SPA is stored
locally in the smart speaker, while others reported that data is
stored either in the cloud owned by the SPA provider, or both
in the smart speaker and the cloud. One user stated that data
is not stored at all since there is so much data to store. All our
interviewees informed us that they do not know how data is
stored and how long the provider keeps it. We further explain
users’ perceptions of how data is stored below depending on
the use case.
Built-in Skills. When using the device to complete every-
day tasks like setting reminders, asking questions and request-
ing updates (e.g., weather), most participants believed that
data is stored to learn more about them and personalize the
SPA experience. Half of the participants believed that these
data were stored locally in the device. One user stated such
data was not stored at all since there were many data to store
and the provider would not be able to handle it all. Another
user mentioned that data (i.e., history) were stored in the mo-
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bile app.
Third-party Skills. Users who were using their SPAs with
other third-party applications reported that their requests and
history logs (e.g., playlists) were only stored by the SPA
provider not mentioning the third-party provider. We observed
that most users of third-party skills (9/11) do not mention their
third-party skills providers storing any data.
Managing Smart Devices. Most users who use their SPA
to manage other smart home devices (5/6) reported that their
commands directed to the smart home devices were stored,
but they only assumed that it was to personalize and improve
their SPAs. In terms of where or who stores the information,
none of the participants mentioned any of the providers of
the smart home devices they were managing through the SPA.
They seem to only believe that their smart speaker stores all
data locally in this case.
Shopping. When using voice purchasing, users believe that
their shopping lists and history are stored by the SPA provider.
They reasoned that this is done to understand their shopping
interests and behaviour. While the majority believed that this
is for advertising purposes, some believed this is for improv-
ing the SPA. Regarding deletion of data, some participants
stated that shopping history is immediately deleted from the
device after shopping.
5.3.3 Data sharing
While the usage of the SPA includes data being shared by
the SPA provider and other different vendors or third-parties,
we observed that users’ perception of how data is handled
and shared is mostly based on the stories of data misuse they
know from other domains. For instance, users believe data is
shared with data brokers and third-parties who are interested
in influencing their behaviour, as P3 explained: “ ...so they
would to try and influence users purchasing decisions”. Other
participants alluded to the Facebook and Cambridge Data
Analytica case [45] and stated that they did not know with
whom their data is being shared but believe it was being shared
with other companies P4 “they could give it to third-party
people to target certain adverts to the user”. However, some
users reported that precisely because of recent data misuse
incidents, they trusted their SPA providers not to share data
with other parties.
In terms of the wider ecosystem, none of the participants
who used the SPA with third-party skills (e.g., Uber) or with
other smart devices (e.g., Phillips bulbs) mentioned data be-
ing accessible to these third parties (e.g. Uber or Phillips),
let alone with whom these third parties might be sharing the
data they gather. That is, no users mention the fact that, be-
cause they may have access to users’ data because of how
the SPA ecosystem work, that they could too share that data
with others, not just the SPA provider. In terms of the specific
data that participants believe is being shared, our participants
informed us that their usage statistics, shopping habits and
play-lists are being shared with other parties like advertisers.
5.3.4 Data Learning
We also asked participants whether their SPA were capable
of learning things about them based on their interaction or
usage. In general, participants perceive SPA as intelligent and
having the ability to learn new things about them without they
telling them to the SPA. They describe them as a brain or hav-
ing a memory to process and remember certain things about
them. Others describe their device as an Artificial Intelligence
(AI) system. In a similar way to processing and storing data,
users seemed to attribute all the learning capabilities to the
smart speaker as opposed to other parts of the SPA ecosystem
involved in it, which they did not mention. They tended to
personify the smart speaker and say it was intelligent.
Regarding how the device learns about them, 13/17 partic-
ipants said the SPA analyses their usage patterns (i.e., ques-
tions, play-lists, history logs and shopping lists) to learn about
their likes and dislikes. Our analysis shows that users believe
their SPA are capable of learning about their shopping habits,
their favourite music and radio stations, routines and its users.
They also believe that the device uses what it learns about
them to tailor adverts for them, serve them well, to influence
their decisions and recommend better things to them (e.g.,
more music from their favourite artist), P17 “It picks up ad-
verts for example on my android phone I get adverts related to
what I have asked my Google Home so it shows that element
of the device listening“. While P7 explained: “I would proba-
bly imagine it stores your information and it [then] begins to
predict through [the data] I would assume... some sort of like
a pattern, therefore, it would [then] start to tailor things to
people that fit that [particular] pattern.”
Some users have mixed attitudes toward the device be-
ing able to learn things about them; some perceive this as
a negative trait while others see it as a useful feature, with
some perceiving both depending on the context — reasoning
very similarly to what well-known theories like Contextual
Integrity [35] aim to explain. For instance, some users stated
that the device being able to learn and know certain things
about them (e.g., morning routine – favourite music, weather,
traffic and news updates) is a good thing as it could simplify
their life. However, they explained that it is not pleasant for
the device to know sensitive things about them, for instance,
health symptoms.
In general, users (including those that perceive learning as
a good thing) find the idea that the device can learn about
them being creepy, scary and invasive, sometimes because
they could never tell when the device is doing the actual
learning. P9 explained: “In a way, it is good for it to give you
suggestions. But, at the same time, it is scary because if you
think about it, if it’s learning things you are doing it is quite
sinister. At the moment I am happy with it, but it does make
me think about what information it can learn about me... what
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profile it can build without me realising”.
5.4 Shopping
In our initial interviews, it quickly became apparent that one
of the use cases we where considering, shopping, was actu-
ally worth studying more in-depth because of a seemingly
low adoption by current SPA users. Both Amazon Echo and
Google Home devices give users the opportunity to shop on-
line. Therefore, we asked all participants about their shopping
experience, the challenges and the concerns they have while
using the device to shop. We aimed to understand how users
view the process of shopping, from the moment they make the
shopping list to the point of payment. We particularly sought
to understand any differences in perception/use among those
who do not use SPA to shop at all, those who use the SPA
to aid their shopping even if not purchasing through the SPA
(e.g. just using shopping lists), and those who actually use the
SPA to purchase items.
Users view voice purchasing as a convenient way of shop-
ping, with some tasks such as creating shopping lists and
paying for goods faster than with other systems. We found
that most of our participants (8/10 Echo users) had not set up
voice purchasing code because they were not using voice pur-
chasing features on their SPA. In general, most participants
(7/10) told us that the voice purchasing code is a useful feature
of the device and adds an extra layer of security. However,
further analysis showed that most users are concerned that
other people around the house (or neighbours) could hear the
code and use it maliciously.
Below we summarize users’ main struggles and concerns
about using the SPA to shop. Mainly, we observed trust, or
more specifically the lack of trust, emerging very strongly as
a theme across different dimensions: products (visibility, com-
parisons, and mistakes), vendors, security of the connection,
and privacy of the orders. In particular:
Product visibility. When we asked our interviewees their
thoughts on using the device for shopping, 10 out of 17 par-
ticipants stated their biggest concern not being able to see the
product they want to purchase.
For instance, P12 said: “I [am] probably kind of against it,
cause I will need [a] screen to see what I am buying, I need
a lot of confirmation; how the products are and what I am
buying, so a visual thing. So just using voice assistant I don’t
think I would ever do that.”.
Product comparisons. Some users expressed the difficul-
ties of comparing products when shopping using the device.
Some Amazon Echo users stressed that Alexa did not give
them a full description of the product but just the name and
the amount. Other Amazon Echo users noted that one could
not get the reviews of the product. Users also raised some
concerns about fake products, that using the device one may
end up ordering a fake product. For instance, P1 explained
why he is not using voice purchasing: “...erm only because
I am aware of scams and fake products on Amazon, I would
like to see what I am buying first.”
Product mistakes. We found that some users were con-
cerned about buying the wrong item because, sometimes,
while they are creating the shopping list, the device gets the
wrong item. In fact, two participants reported an unsuccess-
ful attempt of shopping using the device as they mentioned
the wrong items were added into their shopping basket. For
instance, P5 said “I just ask Alexa to add items to my basket
and it does, but often it adds the wrong items...”.
Number and trustworthiness of vendors. Users expressed
that they have a limited number of vendors to buy from than
when shopping online. For instance, one Amazon user ar-
gued that they are limited when using the device because
they cannot buy from other outlets. However, some Google
Home users thought being connected to a single vendor (like
Amazon Echo users) guarantees security as the user is just
connected to a well-known and trusted outlet. Nonetheless,
some Google Home users informed that the number of ven-
dors is limited and there is a chance of not finding what they
want. Other Google Home users stated that it is difficult to
choose which vendor to use.
Secure connection. Some users, mainly those who had not
set up voice purchasing expressed their concerns over secure
payment and connection during shopping. They stated that it
was challenging to confirm whether they are connected to the
right vendor or the payment process is secure. P9 said, “... I
don’t know if the payment is secured or it’s going through an
encrypted site as a basic example, I like to see something on
a screen rather than doing it on an automated home system.”
Moreover, some further informed us that there are no visual
cues to help them feel they are secure.
People hearing orders and/or code. Some users who were
not using the device to shop highlighted some privacy con-
cerns of other people being able to hear what they are order-
ing, for instance, P14 stated “people around you can easily
hear your purchasing code which isn’t safe if you think about
it”. Others said its easy for other members of the family or
neighbours to hear what they are ordering and that can be un-
pleasant at times. They also mentioned concerns about others
hearing the voice purchasing code and using it without their
permission.
The above struggles and concerns make users utilize a
number of strategies in order to minimize the concerns. Those
include:
Completing the order through the app. To avoid buying
wrong items, some users stated that they use the device to
create shopping lists but always confirm their orders before
paying through mobile apps or website. For example, P5 said:
“I just ask Alexa to add items to my basket and it does ... and
[then] I have to go to the app to make the purchase.” Most
users who used this strategy mentioned that the device is good
for making shopping lists but not ideal for shopping especially
when product details matter.
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Disabling voice purchasing. Most participants mentioned
that they decided not to enable voice purchasing because they
do not trust it. These were users who earlier revealed that they
were not sure how secure the device is when shopping.
Shopping through other platforms. Some users explained
that they still prefer to shop using their apps or the web. They
explained that shopping using other platforms gave them the
opportunity to find better deals and get the right items. Some
users further explained that these other platforms are trustwor-
thy and have been using them for some time. For example,
P10 noted: “I would say the device is great for other things,
but in terms of shopping, it is useful to add things to your
basket, but I would say its better to buy through the website
or app, so you know its safe and secure.”.
5.5 Threat Models and Coping Strategies
To understand users’ privacy and security concerns regarding
owning and using SPAs, we asked users if they thought their
devices could be exploited maliciously or if their data could
be at risk while using the device. We were also interested in
the threat agents – actors who might be interested in such
attempts. Considering the size of the ecosystem and the num-
ber of stakeholders involved, these questions aimed at getting
participants to describe the threats and the attacks that SPAs
might be subjected to. After these questions, we wanted to
know what users do to protect themselves from these threats
and attacks.
All of our participants reported that their SPA could be
exploited. They described how different threat agents could
attack the device. In general, we observed many gaps in their
threat models; users consider few threat agents and exclude
the people they share the device with. Also, they do not con-
sider malicious skills or SPA providers. Users are mostly wor-
ried about unwanted listening from the device. They reported
not knowing how to protect themselves or their devices from
technical attacks but shared various non-technical solutions
they develop to protect themselves.
5.5.1 Threat Agents
While some of the users explained that anyone could hack
the SPA, the most common threat agents that users discussed
were: hackers, government agencies and data brokers (ad-
vertisers). Many of our participants used words like “crimi-
nals” and “fraudsters” to describe potential threat agents. We
grouped all these under the theme “Hackers”. Users gave
various reasons, i.e. motivations, to why these threat agents
would be interested in attacking the SPA. They mentioned
that hackers (and fraudsters) would be interested in targeting
SPA for financial gain, to get personal data which they can
then sell and for blackmailing purposes; government might
do it for spying on users and influencing their decisions; and
advertisers would do it for understanding users’ usage be-
havior and use that for marketing purposes. We also found
that participants who mentioned advertisers highlighted that
data generated by users is considered important, and every-
one is interested in it. However, most users who mentioned
“fraudsters” and “criminals” linked them to financial gains.
For instance, P4 stated “... with the shopping feature [avail-
able], potential people who want to steal money of you can
target it... because your credit card is stored so I would say
fraudsters”.
Despite recent news, e.g., Amazon releasing a user’s Ama-
zon echo recordings to another user [44], users do not nor-
mally consider the SPA providers or providers who have
access to the data, e.g. third-party skill providers, as threat
agents. Also, no one mentioned other household members as
a potential source of problems. However, studies suggest that
smart home devices are weaponized within the family [23].
The only hint towards this was a few participants who men-
tioned the problem of other household members and neigh-
boors overhearing the voice purchasing code.
5.5.2 Attack Types
We found that while users’ threat models consist of different
threat agents, many users struggled to describe attacks that
SPAs can suffer. The most prevalent attack mentioned by our
users is unwanted listening. All our users raised this as a con-
cern and mentioned different threat agents hacking the device
to listen and spy on them. Some users shared advanced attacks
such as attacking the network the device is connected to and
hijacking the commands, but still attacks did not normally
correspond to the real attack surface of SPA (see Section 3).
For example P17 shared “They are connected to the network
so they have IP and storage so they can become part of a
botnet”. Also, they hardly related to any parts of the SPA
ecosystem but the smart speaker — e.g. participants did not
consider malicious skills [29].
5.5.3 Coping Strategies
We found that users do not take any technical solutions to deter
threats or protect themselves. We now discuss the strategies
they follow to protect themselves below.
Unable to protect themselves. Many participants reported
that it is difficult to protect the device because they do not
know what attacks might affect their devices. P4 said: “With
these sorts of things, I don’t really know if there is a way of
protecting yourself...”. P1 further explained: “With my PC
and phone, I have an anti-virus [installed], but I don’t know
how you could protect a speaker...”. This is remarkable, as it
shows many users, even if they might do something to better
protect themselves, simply cannot do it because they do not
know what to do.
Not enabling certain features. Users reported that they
disable (or do not set up) some features and functionality of
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the SPA to minimize or avoid being at risk. One example
of this, as mentioned above, is disabling voice purchasing to
avoid risks associated with shopping. This means many users
are just restricting themselves in terms of the SPA capabilities
they could be using. P10 said: “Somehow yes, I would limit
the things I use it for like I wouldn’t use it for purchasing at
all I’ll stick to shopping lists.”
Using other devices. Some users reported that they use
other devices to complete specific tasks in order to mini-
mize what the device knows about them. For instance, P9
said: “...checking the weather would be ok, but I would be
concerned, for example, if I wanted to find out about a certain
illness a family member has, I wouldn’t do it through Google
home...I would use the computer [be]cause I don’t want that
to be stored [in the SPA]”. Another example of this is that,
as mentioned above, participants tend to complete purchases
using other devices like mobile apps after having created a
shopping list with the SPA. Again, this means that users are
simply not using the SPA for tasks it is capable of doing.
Turning off or muting the smart speaker. We found that
some users switch off their SPAs to stop them from listen-
ing. They turn the device off when they are sleeping, having
private conversations and when they are not home to avoid
unauthorized people using them. P9 explained: “...I would
turn it off when we are not in the house so people can’t access
it when we are not in.” This finding confirms what was also
found in [30], where they asked about whether users used the
muting button of smart speakers, which in turn revealed that
many users were turning off the speakers altogether.
6 Discussion
We now discuss our findings, their implications, and some
recommendations.
6.1 More than Smart Speakers
The majority of users see the smart speakers as the place from
the whole SPA ecosystem where most of the data processing,
storage and learning happens. For instance, when asked to
describe how the SPA process and fulfill requests like weather
updates, the majority of our participants explained that the
device locally processes these commands and respond to the
user, mainly limiting the SPA to the smart speaker, which
would in turn be some kind of a small brain. This shows
that most users have a very simple and inaccurate mental
model of the SPA ecosystem. Even those who actually rec-
ognize that the SPA needs to search for and find information
online do have incomplete mental models. Very few partic-
ipants clearly involved the SPA provider in the processing,
storage, sharing and learning capabilities of SPA, let alone
other important actors in the ecosystem like the third-party
skills providers and the vendors of smart home devices they
manage through the SPA. Therefore, better awareness and
transparency mechanisms may help users understand how
SPA operate, not necessarily from a technical point of view,
but just enough to understand the implications in terms of
their data. Awareness and transparency mechanisms, however,
need to be engineered carefully, to avoid these mechanisms
becoming a lot of information to digest, which may intimidate
and/or become a burden on the users, ultimately ending up of
not much use. In fact, some participants actually complained
about SPA privacy policies and terms of service not being
clear enough for them to understand how their data is handled,
something that one would expect as it is the case in other do-
mains [13, 25, 38, 40]. Recent research suggested that privacy
notices should be relevant, actionable and understandable [41].
In particular, the authors identify four main dimensions to con-
sider when designing to provide notice: timing, when should
a notice be presented; channel, how should the notice be de-
livered; modality, how the information should be conveyed;
and control, how choice options are integrated into the notice.
Research on SPA notices exploring those dimensions would
be really interesting, particularly as conveying notice across
the SPA ecosystem, considering its complexity and the actors
involved, is non-trivial.
6.2 What do I do to protect myself?
Having better transparency mechanisms that help improve
users’ mental models of the SPA ecosystem may not neces-
sarily mean that users are able to protect themselves better.
Although most participants were clearly unaware of the po-
tential threats, which could mean that they underestimate the
security and privacy risks of SPA, and one might be tempted
to attribute this to the inaccurate and incomplete mental mod-
els users have, one of the main problems we encountered
is that most users simply did not know what they could do
to protect themselves when using SPA. This actually leads
to a situation whereby users minimize the use they make of
the SPA to just the cases they think (whether actually right
or wrong) are less dangerous. If users are to make the most
of SPA, we definitely need more usable security and privacy
mechanisms that seemingly integrate with the SPA ecosystem,
together with the awareness and transparency mechanisms
already mentioned, which in turn may help increase users’
trust on SPA.
AI to personalize security/privacy. The first example of
potential mechanisms to explore would be those that could
leverage the AI capabilities SPA have to personalize the ex-
perience to users, so that they would be used to personalize
users’ security and privacy experience. This would contribute
to the cases we found participants felt SPA learning is a good
thing. In this way, recent research already suggested variables
to consider for permissions within a household [24]. This,
together with permissions across the entire SPA ecosystem
considering the actors involved, could be the basis for SPA to
learn what are the kind of contextual social norms that apply
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for particular users and households to govern data processing,
storage, sharing, and learning based on the context to help
users manage and control their data across the SPA ecosys-
tem. In fact, the feasibility of learning contextual social norms
was already shown in other domains [7, 11, 18, 42], and more
recently in generic smart homes [4], but this still needs to be
considered in the context of the whole SPA ecosystem.
Voice recognition for usability and as building-block.
We observed that when the voice recognition setup process
is included in the initial SPA setup as with Google Home/As-
sistant, many more participants seemed to configure it and,
actually, they found the process easy and straightforward. In
contrast, voice recognition in Amazon Echo/Alexa is not part
of the initial setup, and the vast majority of users had not tried
to set voice recognition, with some of them not even knowing
the mechanism exists. While voice recognition may still not
be a mature-enough authentication mechanism in SPA, as it
has been shown to be vulnerable to attacks such as spoofing
through replay attacks [9], there is indeed ongoing research
to make it more secure [16]. The good news is that, from a
usability point of view, this looks like an interesting research
line, because of the aforementioned proportion of participants
who went for voice recognition when they knew about it and
were given the chance to set this up at the initial setup stage.
Voice recognition could also be the basis for other security
mechanisms or to increase trust in some SPA use cases such
as shopping, as explained next.
6.3 Trusted Shopping
We found a lack of trust from users when shopping using
the SPA. While some participants found it useful and conve-
nient to use some of the SPA’s shopping capabilities such as
shopping lists, participants would not normally purchase the
items through SPA. We identified that the main cause of this
was that users did not trust the products, the vendors, and the
process, including the security of the connections and whether
other people might be able to overhear their purchases and
purchase codes. These trust issues need to be addressed in
order to foster purchases through SPA, even more if we look
towards a future where we will delegate more and more tasks
to SPA [10]. Research on the particular mechanisms to make
purchasing through SPA more trustworthy seems like an excit-
ing line of future research. For instance, in terms of products
and vendors, novel ways for an SPA to somehow provide more
verbal information about the products and the vendors, such as
product reviews or vendors’ reputation, would need to be en-
gineered in a usable way. Also, this type of assurances might
need to be complemented with other modalities, something
that may be easier with the new generation of multi-modal
smart speakers, such as the new 2nd generation of Amazon
echo, which includes a screen [3] users could use to check the
products in the shopping list to purchase all in one place, with
the SPA quickly ordering the items as soon as the user con-
firms verbally. Also, and as mentioned above, having voice
recognition from the beginning would make it so the voice
purchasing codes needed in Amazon would not need to be
repeated in each purchase (as it is actually the case [2]), also
mitigating the concerns some users had in terms of others
overhearing the code and using it.
6.4 Limitations
The methodology used was mostly qualitative and exploratory
in nature, therefore the hypotheses we formulated based on
our findings, emerging themes and discussion coming from
the grounded-theoretic analysis, would obviously need to be
tested in a follow-up confirmatory study to assess their validity
and generalizability. We focused on current SPA users, so we
could explore the ecosystem and the parts they understand or
use more/less and why, e.g. lack of trust regarding SPA shop-
ping, and because previous work [30] had already looked at
users and non-users of SPA to study reasons for adoption. Fi-
nally, the interviews were conducted Jan-Feb 2019 after some
major news, including Amazon sending thousands of record-
ings to the wrong user [44], but before the most recent news
regarding Alexa recordings being analysed by humans. While
this might alter mental models regarding the SPA provider,
sometimes mentioned by participants, it might not regarding
third-party skills or other third-parties, who were not in the
news and hardly mentioned by participants. Nevertheless, un-
derstanding how such news could alter users’ mental models,
particularly in terms of the SPA provider, should be studied.
7 Conclusion
This paper reports our study of users’ perceptions of the SPA
ecosystem through semi-structured interviews around four
main use cases of SPA (built-in skills, third-party skills, man-
aging other smart home devices, and shopping). We uncov-
ered users’ misunderstanding of SPA ecosystem, with most
users showing a very limited conception of SPA and inac-
curate and incomplete mental models of the SPA ecosystem
and related data activities (processing, storing, sharing, and
learning). We also uncovered the lack of trust users have with
some of the use cases of SPA, and how this is hampering
adoption particularly of purchasing through the SPA, with
users not having enough information to assess their trust in
the products, the vendors, and the process of voice purchases.
In addition, we reported the threat models users have of SPA,
showing both threat agents and types of attacks users con-
sider possible. We also show the mainly non-technical coping
strategies users follow to try to protect themselves. Finally,
we presented design implications for how SPA might support
users’ expectations and needs with regards to privacy and
security, including researching on mechanisms that help in-
crease awareness, transparency, control, and trust across the
SPA ecosystem.
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A Screening Questions
1. Which device do you own?
Amazon Echo
Google Home
Apple Homepod
Microsoft Cortana
2. How long have you been using the device?
3. How many people within your household use the device?
4. Which of the following voice commands are used to
awaken Amazon’s personal assistant?
"Alexa"
"Computer"
"Hey Amazon"
"I don’t own this device"
5. Which of the following voice commands are used to
awaken Google personal assistants?
"Hey Google"
"Ok Google"
"Google"
"I don’t own this device"
6. Do you use any of the following services on your device?
Play music
Set alarm and reminders
Shopping
Third party services
Managing other smart home devices
7. "Amazon Echo supports third party services called
skills"?
True
False
I don’t own this device
8. "Google Home supports third party apps"
True
False
I don’t own this device
9. Which device has voice purchasing code?
Amazon Echo
Google Home
I don’t know
10. Which device has the capability to distinguish between
different speakers?
Amazon Echo
Google Home
I don’t know
B Interview Questions
1. Which device do you own?
2. Can you tell me about your device, what made you start
using it?
Follow-up: How long have you been using it?
Follow -up: Other than you, who else uses it?
3. What do you use the device for?
Follow up: Do you use third party skills/apps?
Follow up: What do you use?
Follow up: How often do you use it?
Follow up: Did you have to setup anything before you
started using it?
4. Other than your device, do you own any other smart
home device?
Follow up: Do you use your device to control your other
smart home device?
Follow up: How useful is your device in terms of control-
ling your smart home device?
5. How did you register your device?
Follow up: Was this done with your existing account? [If
used an existing one]
Follow up: Is this just for your device or you use the account
for other things as well?
Follow up: Can you tell me why you linked them?
[If not linked]
Follow up: Is there any reason why you didn’t link them?
[If created new account]
Follow up: Is there a reason behind creating a new account
than using an existing one?
6. How many accounts do you have setup on your device?
Follow up: Do these belong to others that use the device?
Follow up: Do you use those other accounts or just one?
[If only one account]
Follow up: Is this shared by multiple users?
Follow up: Can you explain why you chose to share an
account?
7. Have you completed the voice recognition process?
Follow up: How did you find it?
Follow up: Does the device respond to you when you speak
to it?
Follow up: When the device doesn’t respond or understand
you, what do you do?
8. Can the device distinguish users or tell users apart?
Follow up: How do you think this process works?
Follow up: Did you experience any challenges in terms of
the device identifying who you are?
Follow up: If any, what did you do to overcome it?
Follow up: Did you do anything to make the device recog-
nize and identify your voice?
Follow up: What did you do?
9. Do you use the device to shop?
Follow up: Can you share with me your experience in using
the device to shop?
Follow up: What do you exactly do when you shop using
the device?
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Amazon Echo Users only: Did you setup the voice purchas-
ing code?
Follow up: Can you describe your experience setting up
your purchasing code?
Follow up: Is your voice purchasing code always enabled?
[If disabled]
Follow up: Can you tell me why you have it disabled?
Follow up: What are your thoughts on shopping using the
device?
10. Scenario 1 - Built in Services
When[NAME OF BUILT IN SERVICES] how does the
device get the information you requested?
Follow up: Do you know if these requests are stored?
Follow up: [If yes] where do you think they are stored and
for how long?
Follow up: Do you think Amazon or Google use this data
for any purposes?
Follow up: Do you think Amazon or Google share your
data with third parties like advertisers?
Scenario 2: Managing other smart home devices
You have mentioned that you use your device to manage
your other smart home device, can you describe to me how
you think this process works?
Follow up: Do you think what you do [activity history] are
stored?
Follow up: [If yes] where do you think they are stored and
for how long?
Follow up: Do you think your device shares data with
[NAME OF THE OTHER DEVICE COMPANY]?
Follow up: Do you think Amazon or Google and [NAME
OF THE OTHER SMART HOME DEVICE] share your data
with other third parties such as advertisers?
Scenario 3: Third Party Apps You have mentioned that you
use third party skills/apps on your device [NAME] can you
describe to me how you think this process works?
Follow up: How does Alexa or [Google] communicate with
[NAME OF App]?
Follow up: Do you know if these requests are stored and
for how long?
Follow up: Do you think the device shares date with
[NAME OF THE SKILL/APP]?
Follow up: Do you think Amazon or [Google] and [NAME
OF THIRD PARTY SKILL/APP] share your data with other
third party companies such as advertisers?
Scenario 4: Voice Purchasing
You mentioned that you sometimes use your device to
purchase online, can you briefly describe to me how you think
this process works?
Follow up: Do you know if purchasing orders are stored?
Follow up: [if yes] where do you think they are stored and
for how long?
Follow up: Do you think Amazon or Google use this data
for any purposes?
Follow up: Do you think this data is shared with other third
parties like advertisers?
11. DO you think the device is able to learn things about
you based on what you have asked before?
Follow up: How do you think the device is able to do that?
Follow up: Can you give me an example of what you think
it has learned about you previously
Follow up: What are your thoughts on the device being
able to learn things about you that you may not have said to it
explicitly?
Follow up: Where do you think what the device learns
about you is stored?
Follow up: Do you think Amazon or Google could use
what the device learns about you for any purposes?
Follow up: Do you think what the device learns about you
is shared with third parties e.g. advertisers?
12. Do you think the device could be exploited maliciously?
[If yes]
Follow up: Who do you think would be interested in ex-
ploiting the device?
Follow up: What do you think their motive is?
[If no]
Is there any specific reason you think it cannot be ex-
ploited?
13. How do you protect yourself from the device or those
who might attack it?
Follow up: How effective is that?
14. Do you have any concerns on how the device handles
your data?
[If any concerns]
Follow up: Does that impact the way you use the device?
15. Have you ever experienced any conflicts with others
that have access to your device?
16. Have you previously experienced any incidents were
the device has done something without you activating it?
17. Is there anything else you do apart from what we have
talked about already?
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